







C ivil claims are usually terminated by settlement. As many
settlements involve parties represented by lawyers, one
would expect that the controlling legal principles involving law-
yer settlement authority would have been resolved long ago. In
fact, courts and commentators have often declared the settled na-
ture of such principles.' Unfortunately, current legal guidelines
are quite unsettled. Recently, the American Bar Association
(ABA), the American Law Institute (ALI), and several state
supreme courts have each had a significant opportunity to quell
much of the uncertainty. Not only did they fail to seize the mo-
ment, but some compounded existing problems.
This Article will demonstrate the unsettled nature of contem-
porary legal principles governing lawyer civil claim settlement
authority. After reviewing recent ABA and ALI pronounce-
ments, it will review the possible lawmakers. In part, uncertainty
about the guidelines continues because there is confusion and de-
bate about relevant lawmakers. Lawmakers must be determined
in intrastate, interstate, and federal-state settings. The Article
will next demonstrate, particularly through recent state supreme
court decisions, many of the uncertainties plaguing the legal prin-
ciples guiding lawyers' work in civil claim settlements. These
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I See, e.g., Brewer v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1333 (111.
1995) (concerning a lawyer's authority to settle a civil claim on behalf of a plaintiff/
client, the court says "the controlling legal principles are quite settled").
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uncertainties include doubts about express, implied, apparent, in-
herent, presumptive, and retroactive lawyer authority. Both con-
tent and terminology contain difficulties. In conclusion, the
Article will offer suggestions for the appropriate lawmakers and
for the public policies germane to lawyer civil claim settlement
authority, including ideas about possible new ABA, ALI, and
supreme court initiatives.
In part, the unsettled nature of the controlling legal principles
arises because there is confusion, which is often unrecognized,2
over whether general contract or agency law principles should
apply to civil claim settlements. Some courts broadly assert that
civil claim settlements are so comparable to other contracts,3 or
that lawyer-client relationships are so analogous to other princi-
pal-agent relationships,4 that the same contract or agency guide-
lines should apply.5 Further, some courts suggest that civil claim
2 See, e.g., United States v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 986 F.2d 15, 20 (2d Cir.
1993). The Court employed federal law to determine whether an attorney had ap-
parent authority to settle a federal contempt proceeding involving a client. The
court referenced an early version of THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, infra note 27,
and used it to resolve a related question as to the attorney's actual authority, but
then employed the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, infra note 28, in resolving the appar-
ent authority issue. Id.
3 See, e.g., Hayes v. National Serv. Indus., 196 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 1999) ("In
general, the law of contracts governs the construction and enforcement of settlement
agreements."); Dillow v. Ashland, Inc., No. 97-6108, 1999 WL 685941, *1 (6th Cir.,
Aug. 24, 1999) ("In determining whether a settlement agreement is a valid contract,
the district court should refer to state substantive law."); Beverly v. Chandler, 564
So. 2d 922, 923 (Ala. 1990) ("The contract Mary Beverly made with her attorneys
and the settlement agreement made by her attorneys with Dr. Chandler are both
governed by principles of contract law and are as binding on the parties as any other
contract is."); In re Marriage of Davis, 678 N.E.2d 68, 69 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (con-
struing an agreed marriage dissolution judgment, the court said that the "same rules
that apply to construing contracts apply to interpreting divorce decrees"); City of
Chicago Heights v. Crotty, 679 N.E.2d 412 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (involving a similar
ruling for federal civil rights claim settled in state court); Omaha Nat'l Bank of
Omaha v. Mullenax, 320 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Neb. 1982) ("It is virtually undisputed
that a compromise and settlement agreement is subject to the general principles of
contract law and is enforceable under the same principles as other contracts.").
4 See, e.g., Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 649 (Cal. 1985) ("As a gen-
eral proposition the attorney-client relationship, insofar as it concerns the authority
of the attorney to bind his client by agreement or stipulation, is governed by the
principles of agency."). But see, e.g., Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792 F.2d 387, 389 (3d
Cir. 1986) (referencing the general proposition in Blanton, the court recognized that
because this area "implicates practical and ethical considerations peculiar to the ad-
judicatory process ... courts have glossed agency principles" and thus look to both
general agency principles and special judicial precedents for guidance).
5 Some commentators suggest that traditional contract and agency law principles
should apply to the attorney settlement context. See, e.g., Grace M. Giesel, Enforce-
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settlements are so intertwined with the policies behind the claims
being settled that the settlements should be guided by the laws of
those lawmakers who created the relevant substantive laws.6 At
least for pending civil claims, other courts state that any settle-
ments should be chiefly governed by their own civil procedure
laws.7 Frequently, these judicial declarations appear in an all-or-
nothing form, implying that most, if not all, relevant guidelines
originate from a single lawmaker.
The unsettled nature of the controlling legal principles on law-
yer civil claim settlement authority is also attributable to the con-
fusion over proper characterizations of the lawyer-client
relationship. Characterization often results when an all-or-noth-
ing approach is disavowed and the elements of the lawyer-client
relationship are individually analyzed to determine guiding legal
principles. Courts characterize the lawyer-client relationship
when determining who in government has lawmaking powers,
which supreme court lawmaking mechanism should promulgate
new guidelines, or when devising the content of any new guide-
lines. In these determinations, characterizations of the lawyer-
client relationship as substance, procedure, or ethics may be rea-
sonable at times. Often this goes unrecognized where courts gen-
erally assume that all elements of the lawyer-client relationship
should be characterized similarly for settlement purposes.8 Upon
individual inquiry, there is no single characterization which
should apply to all elements of the lawyer-client relationship.
Even in a limited, intrastate setting, where all the relevant
conduct occurs within a single jurisdiction, usually no single char-
acterization will always work. Further, appropriate characteriza-
ment of Settlement Contracts: The Problem of the Attorney Agent, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHIcS 543, 585 (1999) [hereinafter Giesel] (suggesting that a return to old contract
and agency principles will clarify "murky" standards of lawyer settlement authority).
6 See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361-62
(1952) (asserting that questions involving releases of Federal Employers' Liability
Act claims in state courts are governed by the Act since "devices designed to liqui-
date or defeat" such claims "play an important part in the federal Act's administra-
tion" and since "uniform application throughout the country" is essential to
effectuating the Act's purposes).
7 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 1984) (asserting civil case set-
tlement agreements must conform to the Texas civil procedure rule mandating that
agreements "touching any suit pending ... be in writing, signed and filed ... unless
... made in open court and entered of record").
8 See, e.g., Lydon v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 696 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998) (resolving a lawyer civil claim authority question the court stated that "the law
of principal and agent applies to an attorney-client relationship").
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tions of elements of the lawyer-client relationship for settlement
purposes should vary between jurisdictions since relevant
lawmakers as well public policies differ markedly.
II
ABA AND ALI PRONOUNCEMENTS
For lawyer conduct guidelines, the proposals of the ABA usu-
ally have significant influence. ABA pronouncements on lawyer
civil claim settlement authority seemingly began with the adop-
tion of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility on August
12, 1969.9 Its Ethical Consideration 7-7 (EC 7-7) provided guide-
lines for lawyers and lawmakers as follows:
In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits
of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a
lawyer is entitled to make decisions on his own. But otherwise
the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client
and, if made within the framework of the law, such decisions
are binding on his lawyer. As typical examples in civil cases, it
is for the client to decide whether to accept a settlement offer
10
The client's decisionmaking responsibility in criminal case settle-
ments was comparable under EC 7-7 which, after noting that a
"defense lawyer in a criminal case has the duty to advise his cli-
ent fully," stated that "it is for the client to decide what plea
should be entered.""
9 ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992), at 29
[hereinafter 1992 MODEL RULES] ("Prior to the Model Rules, the distribution of
decision-making authority had never been fully addressed in the professions' stan-
dards of conduct. The 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics discussed only the law-
yer's authority to 'control the incidents of trial.' . . . Nor did the Model Code
squarely address the issue ...although the Model Code referred to the client's
authority in a number of its aspirational Ethical Considerations .... ). In the next
edition, published in 1996, the Center simply noted Model Rule 1.2(a) "has no coun-
terpart in the Disciplinary Rules of the Model Code" and quoted a few ethical con-
siderations. ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1999),
at 15 [hereinafter 1996 MODEL RULES]. While specific ABA pronouncements on
lawyer civil claim settlement authority first appeared in 1969, even prior to the 1908
Canons, the 1969 Model Code's policy recognizing client autonomy in settlement
matters was noted in judicial precedents. See, e.g., United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S.
343, 351 (1901).
10MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1969) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]. On other civil case decisions reserved for the client, see, for exam-
ple, In re Marriage of Helsel, 243 Cal. Rptr. 657, 660-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (finding
no authority for attorney to waive clients' fundamental right, such as trial by jury, or
a stipulation impairing a sufficiently substantial portion of the case).
11 MODEL CODE, supra note 10, EC 7-7.
[Vol. 78, 1999]
Unsettling Questions Regarding Lawyer Civil Claim Settlement Authority 1065
On August 2, 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct.12 They continued to recognize expressly ex-
clusive client decisionmaking responsibilities in both civil and
criminal case settlement settings. The pertinent guideline, Model
Rule 1.2, is entitled "Scope of Representation" and states, in
part: "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to ac-
cept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal case, the
lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with
the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered ...."I'
Today, some American states follow EC 7-714 while others fol-
low Model Rule 1.2(a). 15 A few states have not substantially im-
plemented either the ABA Code or the ABA Model Rules, but
rather follow their own variations, including provisions on settle-
ment.16 At least a few states have no pertinent written profes-
sional conduct provisions concerning settlements.
17
The differences in the civil claim settlement guidelines within
EC 7-7 and Model Rule 1.2(a) are minor, as each clearly recog-
nizes a client's exclusive decisionmaking responsibility. The
ABA pronouncements also seemingly equate client settlement
prerogatives in the civil and criminal case settings as the ABA
employs such comparable terms as "decide" and "decision." Be-
cause of the need for personal decisionmaking by criminal de-
fendants in making guilty pleas and thus in criminal case
settlements, was clearly established by the Supreme Court of the
United States as a nondelegable client responsibility before EC
12 1992 MODEL RULES, supra note 9, at 2.
13 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES].
14 See, e.g., GA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7; NEB. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7; VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY EC 7-7; VT. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7.
15 See, e.g., ARIZ. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2; ILL. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2; N.H. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.2; N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2.
16 See, e.g., LA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.2(a) ("Both lawyer
and client have authority and responsibility in the objectives and means of represen-
tation. The client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by
legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional
obligations."). More generally, at least in some states, like New York, the lawyer
professional responsibility provisions, adopted in New York by the four appellate
divisions of the Supreme Court, constitute an amalgam of Model Code, Model Rule,
and non-ABA provisions.
17 Thus, California and Maine do not have any written professional conduct rules
specifically addressing lawyer settlement authority. See CAL. RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT; ME. BAR RULES, Rule 3: Code of Professional Responsibility.
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7-7 was finally adopted, 8 the implication of similar ABA termi-
nology for civil and criminal case settlements is that personal cli-
ent responsibility in both settings was necessary and
nondelegable. 19 Yet, in fact, binding civil claim settlement deci-
sionmaking both inside and outside of civil litigation is often un-
dertaken by lawyers without client participation. 0 At times, this
decisionmaking occurs even where there has been no earlier del-
egation of settlement authority by the client to the lawyer. The
legitimacy of certain civil claim settlements reached only by law-
yers is, in fact, recognized in ABA literature outside the Model
Code and Model Rules, where the derogation of the apparent
policies that underlay EC 7-7 and Model Rule 1.2(a) are not
addressed.21
18 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 n.7 (1969) (noting that in employing
a guilty plea to effect a conviction, a trial judge must be satisfied that a criminal
defendant has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence
and must act only after conducting an on the record examination of the defendant).
19 Comparable personal client responsibility for civil and criminal case settlements
is also often suggested by courts. For example, the California Supreme Court has
said:
We must read the constitutional language in light of the general rule that in
both civil and criminal matters, a party's attorney has general authority to
control the procedural aspects of the litigation and, indeed, to bind the
client in these matters .... In the civil context, the attorney has authority
to enter into stipulations binding on the client in all matters of procedure,
though he or she may not stipulate in a manner to "impair the client's sub-
stantial rights or the cause of action itself." ... Thus the attorney cannot
without authorization settle the suit, stipulate to a matter that would elimi-
nate an essential defense, agree to entry of a default judgment, or stipulate
to nominal damages .... In the criminal context, too, counsel is captain of
the ship. As we said recently: "When the accused exercises his constitu-
tional right to representation by professional counsel, it is counsel, not de-
fendant, who is in charge of the case. By choosing professional
representation, the accused surrenders all but a handful of 'fundamental'
personal rights to counsel's complete control of defense strategies and tac-
tics." . . . It is for the defendant to decide such fundamental matters as
whether to plead guilty ... whether to waive the right to trial by jury...
whether to waive the right to counsel.., and whether to waive the right to
be free from self-incrimination.
In re Horton, 813 P.2d 1335, 1341-42 (Cal. 1991) (quoting People v. Hamilton, 48
Cal. 3d 1142, 1163 (1989)).
20 The inapplicability of the criminal plea procedures to releases of civil claims is
widely recognized. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 70 F.R.D. 639,
645 n.15 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
21 The Indiana Supreme Court has said that the absence of client participation,
and perhaps even delegation, in lawyer civil claim authority cases can be reconciled
with its ABA-inspired law as the former concerns the lawyers' relationship with
third parties and the latter concerns lawyer-client relationships. Yet, it did not ex-
plain why its ABA-inspired law, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule
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Thus, the most recent ABA book containing annotations to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognizes the possible del-
egation by a client to a lawyer of civil claim settlement authority.
It says that authority can be expressly delegated to a lawyer "in
the employment contract or retainer agreement '22 or implic-
itly.23 The most recent ABA book even mentions cases holding
that a client may be bound to a lawyer's settlement, absent any
client delegation, as long as there is apparent authority.24 This
book on the Model Rules also declares that a lawyer generally
has no "inherent authority" to bind a client to a civil claim settle-
ment;25 yet, in so doing, it fails to mention instances of in-court
presumptions of delegated lawyer settlement authority grounded
on inherent authority principles.2 6
The Restatements of the Law by the ALI, including those deal-
ing with The Law Governing Lawyers and the Restatement of
Agency are good sources on the parameters of delegated and un-
delegated lawyer civil claim settlement authority. The Law Gov-
erning Lawyers provides a contrast to EC 7-7 and Model Rule
1.2(a). Its statements on prevailing legal principles directly rec-
1.2(a), required such principles as apparent or implied attorney authority to be for-
bidden in criminal, but not in civil, settings. Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693
N.E.2d 1299, 1303 n.6 (Ind. 1998).
22 1996 MODEL RULES, supra note 9, at 18 ("Ideally, a lawyer's authority can be
found clearly stated in the employment contract or retainer agreement."); see also
1992 MODEL RULES, supra note 9, at 31.
23 1996 MODEL RULES, supra note 9, at 19 ("Authority may also be implied from
a client's more general directive, when the means to follow that directive require the
grant of such authority."); see also 1992 MODEL RULES, supra note 9, at 32.
24 1996 MODEL RULES, supra note 9, at 19 (explaining that cases involving appar-
ent authority reason that a lawyer's substantive decisionmaking authority on behalf
of a client may be presumed by virtue of representation, as well as other cases recog-
nizing apparent authority can arise from "the impression given to a third party" by
the client); see also 1992 MODEL RULES, supra note 9. at 32.
25 1996 MODEL RULES, supra note 9, at 17 ("[A] lawyer has no inherent authority
to settle client's claim."); see also 1992 MODEL RULES, supra note 9, at 31.
26 These instances are covered in the discussion of apparent authority, which
cover client's conduct with adversaries and not with their own lawyers. 1996 MODEL
RULES, supra note 9, at 19; 1992 MODEL RULES, supra note 9, at 32. The Model
Rules are also confusing in other respects. For example, the 1992 MODEL RULES,
supra note 9, at 32, states about implied authority: "A client can ratify the acts or
agreements of his or her lawyer even though those actions exceed the authority
given by the client if the client accepts the results of the lawyer's actions or fails to
object within a reasonable length of time." Here, rather than focusing on conduct
between the client and the lawyer, which can trigger implied delegation of authority
to the lawyer before the lawyer acts, the focus is on conduct by the client before
others after the lawyer has already acted. This focus indicates authority is retroac-
tively given. See also 1996 MODEL RULES, supra note 9, at 19.
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ognize that the delegation of client settlement responsibility to a
lawyer can be express or implied.2 7 Moreover, The Law Gov-
erning Lawyers recognizes apparent authority as a vehicle by
which a lawyer may bind a client to a civil claim settlement even
though no settlement responsibility was actually delegated. Ad-
ditionally, it speaks to both presumptive and retroactive lawyer
authority. Likewise, the Restatement of Agency defines inherent
agency power to include, at times, the authority of a lawyer to
bind a client to a civil claim settlement where there is neither
delegated nor apparent authority.28
Section 33 of The Law Governing Lawyers describes the "deci-
sions" which "are reserved to the client" as including "whether
and on what terms to settle a claim" and "how a criminal defend-
ant should plead." Yet, the section also states that such decisions
may be undertaken by a lawyer for the client "when the client
has validly authorized the lawyer to make the particular deci-
sion."' 29 Section 33, however, limits the opportunity for valid au-
thorization by saying that "[rjegardless of any contrary
agreement with a lawyer, a client may revoke a lawyer's author-
ity to make" any such decision.30 Also, unlike EC 7-7 and Model
Rule 1.2(a), the section recognizes differences between delega-
tions of settlement authority in civil and criminal cases as well as
in differing civil case contexts. It recognizes limits on delegations
where the law "requires the client's personal participation or ap-
proval,"'3' as prevailing criminal and civil laws had often done
even prior to EC 7-7.
Section 38 of The Law Governing Lawyers says that a lawyer's
"act is considered to be that of a client" when "the client has
expressly or impliedly authorized the act."'32 Thus, section 38
recognizes that a client's responsibility for a civil claim settlement
decision can be delegated to a lawyer. Section 38 also provides
that the lawyer's act can bind the client where authority concern-
27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 38 (1998) [here-
inafter THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS].
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A (1958) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
OF AGENCY]. This Restatement also speaks more generally to agent authority by
the acts of a principal in terms comparable to THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS,
supra note 27, which discusses express, apparent, and retroactive authority.
2 9 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 27, § 33(1).
30 Id. § 33(3).
31 Id. § 33(2).
3 2 Id. § 38(1).
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ing the act is reserved to the lawyer.33 In the civil claim settle-
ment context, such authority is reserved to the lawyer if there is a
"law or an order of a tribunal" requiring "an immediate decision
without time to consult the client."34 Finally, section 38 says that
the act of a lawyer is considered to be that of a client where "the
client ratifies the act."
35
Absent actual initial client authorization or later ratification,
section 39 indicates that the acts of a lawyer are also considered
to be those of the client when client conduct constitutes apparent
authority; that is, when a "tribunal or third person reasonably
assumes that the lawyer is authorized to do the act on the basis of
the client's [and not the lawyer's] manifestations of such authori-
zation. ' 36 And, section 37 recognizes that a lawyer appearing in
court on a client's behalf may be presumptively authorized to
represent the client, with the extent of authority left to sections
38 and 39.37
In addition, the Restatement of Agency seems to recognize that
a lawyer may have the "inherent agency power" to bind a client
to a civil claim settlement. Section 8A defines inherent agency
power as "the power of an agent . . . which is derived not from
authority, apparent authority or estoppel, but solely from the
agency relation and exists for the protection of persons harmed
by or dealing with a servant or other agent. ' 38 This section has
been employed by some courts to bind clients to lawyer-
prompted settlements without any client delegation or any client
manifestation of settlement authority in the lawyer.39
Thus, ALl pronouncements provide more informative guides
to lawyer civil claim settlement authority than ABA pronounce-
ments. The former better reflect the existing case law, rules, and
statutes. The ALI pronouncements recognize that a client's
33 Id. § 38(2).
34 Id. § 34.
35 Id. § 38.
36 Id. § 39.
37 Id. § 37 (explaining that "[a] lawyer who enters an appearance before a tribunal
on behalf of a person is presumed to represent that person as a client," though this
presumption may be rebutted).
38 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 8A; see also id. at cmt. b (explain-
ing that "because agents are fiduciaries acting generally in the principal's interests,
and are trusted and controlled by him, it is fairer that the risk of loss caused by
disobedience of agents should fall upon the principal rather than upon third
persons").
39 See, e.g., Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1304 (Ind. 1998).
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responsibility for a civil claim settlement can be delegated to a
lawyer via actual authority;4" that a client can otherwise be
bound to a lawyer's settlement acts, as by way of apparent au-
thority4' or inherent agency power;4 2 and that there are impor-
tant distinctions between civil and criminal case settlements as
well as between settlements of different types of civil cases.4 3
III
THE POSSIBLE LAWMAKERS
Before looking to how the ABA and ALI pronouncements ac-
tually reflect American laws, an exploration of possible
lawmakers seems appropriate. Relevant laws can not be ex-
plored if they can not be found. The ABA and ALI pronounce-
ments say little about who should be making American laws on
lawyer civil claim settlement authority, though they raise signifi-
cant questions about the contents of such laws. If law reform
efforts are undertaken, as we will later urge, difficult issues con-
cerning appropriate lawmakers will certainly arise. Even a cur-
sory exploration of actual and possible lawmakers reveals that
there are several relevant entities, chiefly including the legisla-
ture; the supreme court as rulemaker; and, the supreme court as
case decisionmaker. On occasion, there have been bitter dis-
putes about appropriate allocations of power. These disputes
continue. Significant debates and variations on the allocations of
law-making powers can be found in intrastate, interstate, and
federal-state settings.
Such disagreements can be illustrated by a cursory review of
the requirements of the federal Older Workers Benefit Protec-
tion Act ("FOWBPA"),4 4 which guides the waiver of claims
under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"). 45  These requirements guide civil claim settle-
ments, 46 as do explicit requirements on lawyer authority, to act
40 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 27, § 38.
41 Id. § 39.
42 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 8A.
43 THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 27, § 33(2) (recognizing civil jury
trial waiver laws can require "the client's personal participation or approval"); see,
e.g.. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1994) (waiver of jury trial right for federal age discrimina-
tion claim).
44 29 U.S.C. § 626(f).
45 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
46 These statutory mandates are recognized as containing "stricter requirements
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on behalf of a client. In part, the FOWBPA requires the
following:
(f) Waiver
(1) An individual may not waive any right or claim under
this [chapter] unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Ex-
cept as provided in paragraph (2), a waiver may not be consid-
ered knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum-
(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individ-
ual and the employer that is written in a manner calculated to
be understood by such individual, or by the average individual
eligible to participate;
(E) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an
attorney prior to executing the agreement;
(2) A waiver in settlement of a charge filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, or an action filed in
court by the individual or the individual's representative, al-
leging age discrimination of a kind prohibited under section
. .. 623 or 633a [of this title] may not be considered knowing
and voluntary unless at a minimum-
(A) subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph (1) have
been met; and
(B) the individual is given a reasonable period of time
within which to consider the settlement agreement.47
In considering such requirements, significant questions will arise
about lawmaking powers in intrastate, interstate, and federal-
state settings. In the intrastate civil action setting, determina-
tions of who promulgates such requirements often will be guided
by initial characterizations. Three issues arise early on: whether
a requirement as to a writing (and presumably as to a signature
of the claimant on the writing 48 ) under section (f)(1)(A) is (1)
substantive (antidiscrimination) law, usually made by the legisla-
ture; (2) procedural law (at least when used in civil actions),
often made with the involvement of both the high court and the
legislature; or, (3) lawyer professional conduct law (since there
on settlements of ADEA claims" than apply to Title VII claims. Watson v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 132 F.3d 37 (7th Cir.), affg No. 96C389 (N.D. II1. 1997).
47 29 U.S.C. § 626(f).
48 Compare Lavan v. Nowell, 708 So. 2d 1052, 1052 n.3 (La. 1998) (stating that a
code provision requiring that a compromise agreement must be "in writing" implic-
itly mandates "signatures of both parties") with Johnson v. Department of Correc-
tions, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1700, 1703 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that a statute
requiring a party's written or oral stipulation means the party's own personal
agreement).
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are limits on the settlement authority which might otherwise be
delegated to lawyers), typically made only by the supreme court.
In the interstate civil action setting, initial characterizations again
play a role. Is the section (f)(1)(A) limit on lawyer authority a
civil procedure law requisite, usually guided by forum law; a sub-
stantive law requisite guided by the policies underlying the an-
tidiscrimination claim; or, at least in part, a lawyer ethics law,
typically guided by the law of the licensing state? Finally, when a
federal age discrimination employment claim is presented in a
state trial court, there can be inquiry into characterization, rais-
ing issues of the ethical, substantive, and procedural law con-
straints on lawyers.
A. Intrastate Lawyer Settlement Authority Issues
For any American state, as well as for the federal government,
there are several potential lawmakers involved in wholly internal
matters relating to lawyer civil claim settlement authority. Possi-
ble lawmakers and the scope of their powers must be explored
contextually. Even though there are often similar end results
originating from different lawmakers, a wide variety of ap-
proaches to the allocation of lawmaking powers are relevant to
court procedures and the practice of law. The starting point for
any intrastate inquiry is the express provisions of the constitu-
tion; most frequently, the relevant provisions will address judicial
procedural rulemaking,49 supervisory,50 administrative,51 or regu-
latory52 powers, as lawyer settlement authority issues arguably
49 See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. V, § 5 ("[Slupreme court may establish rules relating
to practice, procedure and pleading for all courts and administrative tribunals");
N.C. CONST. art. IV, §13(2) ("The General Assembly may make rules of procedure
and practice for the Superior Court and District Court Divisions, and the General
Assembly may delegate this authority to the Supreme Court"). On whether civil
procedure rules on claim settlements may abridge substantive rights, see Kennedy v.
Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Tex. 1984) (questions are unaddressed but deemed
"pioblematical").
50 See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2(2) (stating that the supreme court "has
general supervisory control over all other courts"); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (provid-
ing general supervisory authority over all courts vested in supreme court and exer-
cised by chief justice).
51 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (stating that judicial council shall "adopt rules
for court administration . . . not inconsistent with statute"); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16
("General administrative ... authority over all courts is vested in the Supreme Court
and shall be exercised by the Chief Justice"); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 28(b) (stating
that the chief administrator "shall supervise the administration and operation of the
unified court system").
52 See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 28 ("The Supreme Court shall make rules regu-
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may be within the ambit of any or all of these powers. Usually,
but certainly not always, lawyer civil claim settlement authority
may also be deemed by the courts to be subject to inherent judi-
cial power.53 This authority can emanate from separation of
powers principles,54 especially where express constitutional pro-
visions about relevant lawmaking powers are absent and where
any other constitutional provisions are too uncertain to be em-
ployed alone. Even where there are seemingly clear constitu-
tional allocations of lawmaking powers, usually to the supreme
court, occasionally territorial battles on characterization are still
waged.55 And, even without an interbranch war, contextual in-
quiry may be necessary since initially allocated powers from the
constitution, statute, or some other source, can usually be fully,
or at least significantly, reallocated.56 Examples of reallocations
include powers to the supreme court by the legislature; 57 powers
lating the practice of law and the professional conduct of attorneys at law"); FLA.
CoNsT. art. V, § 15 ("The supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons
admitted.").
53 See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Crucible of Lawyer Self-
Protection: Reflections on the LLP Campaign, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 359, 374-76 (1998).
Through a "negative" form of inherent powers concept, courts may declare any stat-
ute unconstitutional that deals with lawyer regulation; however, this power on occa-
sion is not used, as where, via "comity," the courts "accept" the statutes. Id. A
recent illustrative case is Kunkel v. Walton, 689 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (I11. 997) (invali-
dating a portion of the 1995 Illinois Civil Justice Reform Amendments dealing with
waivers of the doctor-patient privilege in bodily injury cases).
54 See, e.g., Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1094-96 (Ill. 1997).
55 See, e.g., Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio
1999). Since high court civil procedure rules still can not be overridden by legisla-
ture, the resurrection of an earlier invalidated statute dealing with medical malprac-
tice pleading, notwithstanding its new express characterization as "substantive," is
itself invalidated as the court laments the latest chapter in "turbulence among...
coordinate branches of government" arising from tort reform efforts wherein the
legislature chooses "to usurp" the high court's authority "by refusing to recognize"
its holding. Id.
56 As with substantive lawmaking, on such matters as commercial trade and envi-
ronmental protection, which has been reallocated to administrative agencies, there
may be limits on the ability of initially allocated court procedure/legal profession
lawmakers to reallocate their powers, especially if the initial powers are constitu-
tionally granted. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (stating
that justices differ on constitutionally-based nondelegation doctrine in the adminis-
trative agency setting).
57 See, e.g., N.C. CoNsT. art. IV, § 13(2) (stating that while the General Assembly
has the power to make "rules of practice and procedure," it "may delegate this au-
thority to the Supreme Court"); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076 ("[W]ith the ap-
proval of the Supreme Court, the Board of Governors may formulate ... rules of
professional conduct for all members of the bar in the State.").
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shared between the supreme court and the legislature;58 and
powers shared between the supreme court and lower courts.5 9
As well, powers exercised by a single lawmaker can be exercised
in a variety of ways, such as by a court, through either judicial
rulemaking or case decision.6 °
1. Lawyer Conduct Laws
A significant guide to the legal principles on American lawyer
civil claim settlement authority within a single jurisdiction is con-
tained in the sets of state supreme court rules on lawyer profes-
sional conduct. These rules are often fashioned under a
constitutionally-recognized power to regulate the practice of
law. 6 Here, such professional conduct rules usually stand apart
from other sets of court-promulgated rules, such as rules of civil
procedure, evidence, and appellate practice, and generally follow
ABA pronouncements.62 On lawyer civil claim settlement au-
thority, these professional conduct rules typically follow either
Model Rule 1.2(a) or EC 7-7, meaning that the details may be
substantially fleshed out in interpretive court decisions.63
58 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, div. 3, ch. 4, arts. 5-6 (stating that while
article 5 recognizes lawyer conduct standards and disciplinary proceedings may in-
volve the Board of Governors, article 6 establishes certain General Assembly stan-
dards for lawyer conduct and recognizes possible disciplinary proceeding involving
the Supreme Court): O'Connell v. St. Francis Hosp., 492 N.E.2d 1322, 1326 (I11.
1986) (permitting "concurrent" procedural rulemaking powers, as long as General
Assembly does not unduly infringe upon court's regulation of judicial system).
59 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (stating that the Supreme Court and lower courts
may "prescribe rules for the conduct of their business," but lower court rules "shall
be consistent with Acts of Congress" as well as with any Supreme Court rules).
60 Consider, for example, the work product doctrine applicable in federal civil ac-
tions, which was first substantially defined in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(1947), but was later codified in FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The discretion to
lawmaker either by rulemaking or case decision can, at times, be constrained. See,
e.g.. 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (stating that while other evidence rules do not need congres-
sional approval, rules on evidentiary privileges must be approved by Congress, so
lawmaking via rulemaking here seemingly is forbidden).
61 See, e.g., Amendment to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 605 So. 2d 252 (Fla.
1992) (ordering the amendment of regulatory rules for lawyers issued under consti-
tutional authority recognizing both the "exclusive" high court jurisdiction to admit
and discipline lawyers and the power to adopt "practice and procedure rules," under
FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 2(a), 15).
62 But see ARIZ. SuP. Ci. R. 42 (containing Arizona Rules of Professional
Conduct).
63 Such court decisions may not, in fact, reflect interpretations of the ABA-in-
spired state law. See, e.g., Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1303 n.6
(Ind. 1998) (holding that while the Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) "paral-
lels" judicial precedents on attorney civil claim settlement authority, the former
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Though they may not contain a separate provision dealing with
settlement authority, on occasion, there is a more distinct set of
court rules on lawyer conduct 64 that leaves guidelines to case de-
cisions.65 Sometimes, there is a statutory scheme that signifi-
cantly regulates legal practice, including aspects of lawyer civil
claim settlement authority.66
2. Civil Procedure Laws
Other major sources of laws on lawyer civil claim settlement
authority are civil procedure codes or civil procedure rules. Sec-
tion 664.6 of the California Civil Procedure Law states that a
stipulation about a civil claim settlement may be presented in "a
writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or
orally before the court., 67 Texas Civil Procedure Rule 11 man-
dates that "no agreement between attorneys or parties touching
any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed
and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be
made in open court and entered of record. '' 68 This provision has
been interpreted to limit the circumstances under which lawyers
may settle the civil claims of their clients.6 9
deals only with the lawyer-client relationship while the latter concerns the attorney's
"dealings with third parties" on behalf of the client).
64 See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3-510 (requiring a lawyer to
communicate written offers of settlement and is read to require further the commu-
nication of significant oral offers of settlement).
65 See, e.g., Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 647 (Cal. 1985) (discussing
implied actual authority and apparent authority of lawyer to settle a client's claim).
66 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 9.005-9.990 (1999) (regulating attorneys and in-
cluding section 9.330 on the authority of an attorney to bind a client by the attorney
and client agreement). In Oregon, legal practice guidelines may also originate from
the state bar board of governors and the Supreme Court, under OR. REV. STAT.
§ 9.490 (rules of professional conduct), or from the Council on Court Procedures,
under OR. REV. STAT. § 1.735 (practice and procedure rules in civil proceedings). In
the absence of a significant statutory scheme, special laws can address lawyer civil
claim settlement authority. See, e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE ANN. art. 3071 (West 1998)
(stating that an agreement ending a lawsuit "must be either reduced into writing or
recited in open court"); Felder v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 405 So. 2d 521, 523 (La.
1981) (holding that the code provision necessarily implies that any writing be signed
by both parties).
67 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 664.6 (West 1998).
6 8 TEx. CIV. PROC. CoDE ANN. R. 11 (West 1999); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 3071 (West 1998) (stating that a contract to end lawsuit "must be either reduced
into writing or recited in open court.").
69 Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 528-29 (Tex. 1984) (holding Rule It applies
to civil claim settlements).
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3. Special Statutes
With or without far-reaching professional conduct and civil
procedure laws, special statutes can address lawyer civil claim
settlement authority for discrete civil claims; for example,
FOWBPA does this, though implicitly. Notwithstanding the gen-
eral provisions of Texas Civil Procedure Rule 11, the Texas Fam-
ily Code controls lawyer settlement authority in certain marriage
dissolution cases. A Texas statute provides: "A mediated settle-
ment agreement is binding on the parties if the agreement: (1)
provides in [a separate paragraph] that the agreement is not sub-
ject to revocation; (2) is signed by each party .. .; [and] (3) is
signed by the party's attorney."70 By requiring that certain
agreements be written and signed by each party and the lawyer,
the legislature has limited many forms of delegated and undele-
gated lawyer civil claim settlement authority. Likewise, in Loui-
siana, a statute on certain property disputes mandates that
authority "must be given expressly to .. .enter into a compro-




Finally, lawyer civil claim settlement authority may be guided
by case precedents. An Illinois Supreme Court decision involv-
ing the recognition of an "in court" presumption about express
lawyer civil claim authority illustrates such guidelines.72 The
court said that "[w]hile an attorney's authority to settle must be
expressly conferred, the existence of the attorney of record's au-
thority to settle in open court is presumed unless rebutted by af-
firmative evidence that authority is lacking. '
73
B. Interstate Lawyer Settlement Authority Issues
While there are difficulties in locating powers regarding lawyer
settlement authority allocated and reallocated to lawmakers
within a single government, in many multistate conduct settings
the ascertainment of possible lawmakers and applicable guide-
lines is even more difficult. Hard choices must be made at times
when two or more involved governments differ in their ap-
7 0 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602 (West 1999).
71 LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2997 (West 1998) (covering the different modes of
acquiring the ownership of things).
72 Brewer v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1334 (Ill. 1995).
73 Id. (quoting Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 432 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (Ill. 1982)).
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proaches. Assuming there is only one state, is it the law of the
licensing state of the lawyer which governs civil claim settlement
authority? Or, assuming there is only one location, is it the law
of the state where the lawyer was retained, where the client lives,
or where the alleged settlement was reached?74 Or, is it the law
of the government whose substantive law defines the claim to be
settled? Or, is it the law of the government with "the most signif-
icant relationship to the parties and the transaction"?75 And, are
the means of choosing among the laws of competing jurisdictions
altered when differing types of civil claims are at issue or when
the civil claims have already been presented to a government
supported adjudicatory body, like a trial court? Again, charac-
terizations with early focus on substance/procedure/ethics dis-
tinctions are often crucial. Neither the ABA nor the ALI
pronouncements provide much guidance for drawing these dis-
tinctions in interstate settings.
While there was no counterpart in the ABA Model Code, the
ABA Model Rules do contain a choice of law provision for law-
yer disciplinary proceedings. Model Rule 8.5(b) says:
In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction,
the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as
follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court
before which a lawyer has been admitted to practice . . . the
rules to be applied shall be the rules of the jurisdiction in
which the court sits, unless the rules of the court provide
otherwise; and
(2) for any other conduct,
(i) if the lawyer is licensed to practice only in this jurisdiction,
the rules to be applied shall be the rules of this jurisdiction,
and
(ii) if the lawyer is licensed to practice in this and another ju-
risdiction, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of the ad-
mitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally practices;
provided, however, that if particular conduct clearly has its
predominant effect in another jurisdiction in which the lawyer
is licensed to practice, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be
applied to that conduct.
76
74 Bamerilease Capital Corp. v. Nearburg, 958 F.2d 150, 152 (6th Cir. 1992) (em-
ploying lex loci rule of Ohio to settlement contract question in diversity case).
75 Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1033 (3d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted) (hold-
ing that the Pennsylvania choice of law rule, which as employed by the federal court
included consideration of not only facts relating to the alleged settlement, but also
facts relating to where the initial claim arose).
76 MODEL RULES, supra note 13, § 8.5(b).
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However appealing such an approach may be for interstate con-
flicts over lawyer civil claim settlement authority, the provision
has not yet been widely used there, perhaps because the Model
Rules as a whole are deemed by the ABA not "to augment any
substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary conse-
quences of violating such a duty. '7 7 In addition, the Model Rule
approach may be unwise in civil claim settlement authority are-
nas because it contains at least some seeds of uncertainty. 78 In
The Law Governing Lawyers, the ALI found the ABA rule for
choice of law in disciplinary proceedings too "rigid" and opted
for a more uncertain approach involving presumptive prefer-
ences and utilization of the most significant relationship test.79
C. Federal-State Lawyer Settlement Authority Issues
Beside intrastate and interstate issues, federal-state issues can
arise regarding lawyer civil claim settlement authority. Most
often they surface when a state law claim is presented in a federal
court or when a federal law claim is presented in a state court.80
For such federal court presentations, case precedents have been
required since there is no comprehensive scheme of general law-
yer conduct standards that is applicable nationwide in the Article
III federal courts8 and only a few relevant general federal civil
77 1996 MODEL RULES, supra note 9, at xviii (statement as to scope of Model
Rules).
78 Uncertainties include locating places of principal legal practice; defining pre-
dominant effect; and, determining how to proceed when one or more, but not all,
involved states view lawyer civil claim settlement authority as something other than
a matter of lawyer professional conduct.
79 THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 27, § 5 cmt. h (stating that each
issue for which there is a conflict must be addressed on its specific facts as there is no
more specific formula than the significant relationship test).
80 Outside of these settings, federal-state issues can arise where federal law claims
are presented in federal court, but where lawyer civil claim settlement authority may
nevertheless be governed by state law. Compare, e.g., Tiernan, 923 F.2d at 1032-33
(stating that an attorney's authority to settle pending federal and state law claims
may be governed by state law) with Michaud v. Michaud, 932 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir.
1991) (stating that courts will "apply federal law to the issue of an attorney's author-
ity to settle a civil action brought under federal law"). Compare, e.g., Reo v. United
States Postal Serv., 98 F.3d 73, 76 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying state-law standards on
parental authority to settle a minor child's claim, as there was no distinct need for
nationwide legal standards and there was well-developed state law) with Neilson v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 993 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that according to
local court rule a guardian's ability to settle federal civil rights claims of an incompe-
tent need not be followed).
81 Recently, some proposals have been floated and a United States Judicial Con-
ference committee has been exploring the feasibility and suitability of both general
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procedure laws.82 Precedents have addressed matters like lawyer
civil claim settlement authority for in-court proceedings83 and for
settlements grounded on a lawyer's implied or apparent author-
ity.84 Characterization often plays a key role but analysis is often
cursory.85 For presentations of federal law claims in state courts,
usually the lawyer professional conduct standards of the forum
state are employed without much analysis or objection since
many federal courts expressly defer generally to these state stan-
dards,86 and characterization as an ethics law matter is usually
not disputed. This premise also applies to many federal law
claims that are presented in the federal courts.
The failure to pay more attention to federal-state issues involv-
ing lawyer civil claim settlement authority is unfortunate. The
unsettled questions are especially troubling since an explosion of
related issues and new questions seems imminent. The recent
amendments to Federal Civil Procedure Rule 16 expressly permit
a district court to "require that a party or its representatives be
present or reasonably available by telephone in order to consider
possible settlement of the dispute."87 Inevitably, questions will
arise about whether federal or state lawmakers should determine
and specific federal policies. See, e.g., Comment, Uniform Federal Rules of Attorney
Conduct: A Flawed Proposal, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2063 (1998).
82 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (certifications of litigation papers by attorneys); 28
U.S.C. § 1927 (unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings by
attorneys).
83 See, e.g., Oliver v. Kroger Co., 872 F. Supp. 1545 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (using Texas
civil procedure rule).
84 See, e.g., Glazer v. J.C. Bradford and Co., 616 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1980) (using
Georgia law): Hayes v. National Serv. Indus., 196 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 1999) (same).
85 See, e.g., Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1033 (3d Cir. 1991). The Tiernan
court concluded that the focus of inquiry about lawyer civil claim settlement author-
ity should be on an attorney's relationship with the client; in a federal civil case there
is no substantial federal interest affected during such an inquiry and so state law
should be employed, even though the attorney's conduct occurred in a conference
before the federal trial judge which seemed key to the legal issue involving settle-
ment authority. Id.
86 See, e.g., U.S. DisT. CT. S.D. ILL. R. 83.4(d)(2) ("The Rules of Professional
Conduct adopted by this Court are the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by
the Supreme Court of Illinois .. .except as otherwise provided by specific rule of
this Court."). But see U.S. DIST. CT. N.D. ILL. R. 3.52(B). Misconduct and grounds
for discipline are set out in the court's own Rules of Professional Conduct, which
significantly follow the ABA Model Rules. By contrast, standards for lawyer con-
duct found in, for example, state civil procedure laws are not subject to such express
recognition and would only be employed in federal courts after an Erie doctrine
analysis. See, e.g., Oliver, 872 F. Supp. at 1547 (using Texas Civil Procedure Rule
11).
87 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).
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when a lawyer is a "representative" able to "consider" (and ef-
fectuate) settlement under Rule 16. In a comparable setting in-
volving an "agent" under a federal rule of civil procedure for
receipt of service of process, the United States Supreme Court
opted for a "uniform federal standard" on agency rather than
giving deference to state law where there were likely "contrary
local policies."88 A similar ruling under Rule 16 would prompt
uniformity but undercut the traditional deference accorded by
federal courts to state lawyer professional conduct standards.
The use of federal law standards would also invite possible differ-
ences between in-court and out-of-court legal representation.
IV
CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS FOR LAWYER CIVIL
CLAIM SETTLEMENT AUTHORITY
A. Delegated Authority
Notwithstanding the ABA pronouncements, a client can usu-
ally delegate authority to a lawyer to settle a civil claim.89 Dele-
gated authority, also often called "actual" authority, may be
given either expressly or implicitly, with the focus in each setting
on the conduct between the client and the lawyer, involving
chiefly the "written or spoken words or other conduct" of the
client.9" Relevant client conduct includes express written or oral
direction. These directives can bestow very narrow or very broad
settlement authority. Relevant conduct also includes client ac-
tions which cause the lawyer to reasonably believe that the client
wishes the lawyer to act upon settlement in the client's behalf.91
1. Express Authority
One traditionally-recognized form of actual authority is ex-
press authority. As described in section 38 of The Law Gov-
88 National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964) (interpreting
what is now Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Civil Procedure Rules).
89 Exceptions can arise both in certain procedural law and substantive law set-
tings, as where the signature of the party/client is needed. See, e.g., Cook v. Surety
Life Ins. Co., 903 P.2d 708 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that a writing is required to
delegate express authority to settle).
90 See, e.g., Scott v. Randle, 697 N.E.2d 60, 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citing RE-
STATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 26).
91 Id.; see, e.g., Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792 F.2d 387, 389 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding
implied authority where client repeatedly told lawyer it was the lawyer's "job" to
arrive at a settlement figure).
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erning Lawyers, a "lawyer's act is considered to be that of a
client in proceedings before a tribunal or in dealings with third
persons when: (1) the client has expressly . . . authorized the
act.'92 A comparable provision in section 7 of the Restatement of
Agency states that authority is "the power of the agent to affect
the legal relations of the principal by acts done in accordance
with the principal's manifestations of consent to him."93 The ac-
companying comment recognizes that while it is "possible for a
principal to specify minutely what the agent is to do" by creating
"express authority", most authority is "created by implication"
meaning that it is "inferred from the words used, from customs
and from the relations of the parties."94
Notwithstanding the guidance provided by the ALI, significant
difficulties have arisen when courts must determine what type of
client conduct is sufficient to trigger express authority to settle.
There is disagreement on whether verbal assertions will always
suffice or whether a writing is required. Likewise, there are dis-
agreements on the specificity of the language or conduct re-
quired, as well as on the means by which express authority may
be revoked. Finally, there are disagreements on the burdens of
proof relevant to matters relating to express authority.
Some jurisdictions find that the mere retention of a lawyer is
sufficient conduct to create express authority. For example, one
federal court said "it is well established" that a lawyer "retained
for litigation purposes is presumed to possess express author-
ity."95  Elsewhere the holdings differ. Thus, the Vermont
Supreme Court has held that the mere retention of a lawyer,
even when coupled with express permission to negotiate on the
client's behalf, did not authorize the lawyer to enter into a settle-
ment agreement.96
92 THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 27, § 38.
93 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 7.
94 Id. § 7 cmt. c; see also id. § 26 cmt. c (stating that the "authority to perform a
particular act can be conferred by the specific words of a statement to the agent" or
"be inferred from words or conduct which the principal has reason to know indicate
to the agent that he is to, do the act for the benefit of the principal"). At times,
express authority is employed for conduct not involving client-lawyer directives.
See, e.g., Brewer v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1334 (I11. 1995)
(creating a presumption of express authority when lawyer appears for client in open
court).
95 HNV Cent. River Front Corp. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 547, 549 (1995); see
also Bryant v. Department of Justice, 86 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
96 New England Educ. Training Serv., Inc. v. Silver St. Partnership, 528 A.2d 1117,
1119 (Vt. 1987).
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Likewise, state governments vary on the form of express au-
thorization required to delegate settlement authority. Many
states allow a client to delegate express authority orally to a law-
yer.97 Conversely, some states require written client delegation
of express authority to settle. Thus, the Hawaii Supreme Court
found that a statute which said "no practitioner shall have power
to . . . settle such matters confided to the practitioner, unless
upon special authority in writing from the practitioner's client"98
"clearly sets restrictions" on a lawyer's ability to settle a matter. 99
Even if a client's delegation of settlement authority is in the
proper form, uncertainties can still arise about the specificity of
the language or conduct required. Some jurisdictions hold that
general language by the client is enough to delegate express au-
thority to settle. One federal appeals court held that "it is per-
missible for a client to give its lawyer general authority to settle
cases."' 00 The court even thought it "unnecessary" to define the
exact meaning of express authority or to decide whether "the
rule of express authority requires an explicit oral or written grant
of settlement authority, rather than a general consent by the cli-
ent." 10 1 Other courts require more specific language or conduct
expressly authorizing the lawyer to settle. For example, another
federal appeals court, employing Pennsylvania law, said that ex-
press authority "must be the result of explicit instructions regard-
ing settlement." 102
Moreover, there is conflict among jurisdictions about which
types of delegations of express authority may be valid. The ALl
and several states declare that nonrevocable delegations of set-
tlement authority via general retainer agreements are void. Sec-
tion 33 of The Law Governing Lawyers states that regardless of
any contrary agreement with a lawyer, a "client may revoke a
97 See, e.g., Hays v. Fischer, 777 P.2d 222, 226 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that a
client's oral concurrence to settle the case for $10,500 expressly authorized the law-
yer to settle).
98 Hawai'i Hous. Auth. v. Uyehara, 883 P.2d 65, 71 (Haw. 1994); see also Cook v.
Surety Life Ins. Co., 903 P.2d 708, 714 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that a lawyer
did not have express authority as "the express written consent of the client is re-
quired in settlement proceedings").
99 Cook, 903 P.2d at 71 (interpreting HAW. REV. STAT. § 605-7).
100 Smedley v. Temple Drilling Co., 782 F.2d 1357, 1360 (5th Cir. 1986).
101 Id.
102 Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1033 (3d Cir. 1991).
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lawyer's authority., 113 Accordingly, section 33 forbids an irrevo-
cable delegation of settlement authority through a general re-
tainer agreement. °4  And, the Georgia Supreme Court
invalidated a nonrevocable contingent fee agreement which dele-
gated full settlement authority to the lawyer.'0 5 Conversely,
some jurisdictions allow such a nonrevocable delegation of settle-
ment authority in the general retainer agreement. For example,
the Alabama Supreme Court upheld a provision of a retainer
agreement which stated: "I give and grant unto him full power to
act as my attorney ... to settle said claim at his discretion before
or after suit is instituted and to take any and all steps which he
deems proper and desirable."'0 6 The court sustained this delega-
tion of settlement authority "with no limitations or restrictions,"
finding "a client can give express authority to his or her attorney
to act, by signing an employment contract that gives this
authority." 107
Finally, jurisdictions employ different burdens of proof in de-
termining whether a lawyer has been delegated express authority
to settle. The burden of proof regarding a lawyer's express au-
thority to settle may be placed upon either of the parties.10 8 For
103 THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 27, § 33(3) (dealing with author-
ity reserved to the client).
104 Id. at cmt. c.
105 In re Lewis, 463 S.E.2d 862 (Ga. 1995).
106 Beverly v. Chandler, 564 So. 2d 922, 924 (Ala. 1990).
107 Id. at 924. But see Newton v. SuperMarkets Gen. Corp., No. CIV.A. 88-4165,
1989 WL 144104, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 1989). In Newton a written agreement
stated "client authorizes the Law Offices of Herbert Monheit, P.C. to negotiate,
prosecute, and within their sole discretion settle client's claim." While the court
stated that such a writing "could constitute express authorization" to settle as ex-
press authority may flow from a grant of general authority, it also suggested that a
"blanket authorization without appropriate follow-up" may be "inconsistent" with
Rule 1.4 of the Model Rules requiring that a client be kept "reasonably informed."
Id.; see also Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 513 F.2d 892, 892-93 (10th Cir. 1975)
(finding that a retainer contract indicating lawyer would settle for a group of claim-
ants if majority wished was invalid when a minority of claimants later objected to
settlement).
108 In Florida, for instance, the burden of proof to demonstrate that a client has
delegated express authority to a lawyer is placed on the party seeking to demon-
strate a settlement agreement. Linardos v. Lilley, 590 So. 2d 1064, 1064 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991). Such a burden of proof is protective of a client's interest in control-
ling the fate of the cause of action. But in Newton, a federal court found "that the
Pennsylvania courts would likely place the burden of proof on the client to establish
that his attorney lacked the requisite authority . . . the client has greater access to
information . . . between his attorney and himself than does the opposing party."
1989 WL 144104. at *2.
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example, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed a lower court deci-
sion employing a "preponderance of the evidence" burden of
proof as to the existence of a lawyer's settlement authority. t0 9
Yet, the New Mexico Supreme Court suggested a higher stan-
dard, saying that a "client may give his attorney . . . express au-
thority. . . but such authority must be clear and unequivocal."110
2. Implied Authority
Another form of actual authority is implied authority. In The
Law Governing Lawyers, section 38 states that a "lawyer's act is
considered to be that of a client in proceedings before a tribunal
or in dealings with third persons when: (1) the client has ... im-
pliedly authorized the act." '111 The ALI Law Governing Lawyers
also cross-references the Restatement of Agency, section 7, com-
ment c, which provides that "most authority is created by impli-
cation[,] . . . powers are all implied or inferred from the words
used, from customs and from the relations of the parties." '112
Even though The Law Governing Lawyers suggests that a law-
yer may bind a client through implied authority, 113 some state
courts seemingly hold otherwise. For example, the Illinois
Supreme Court has said that the "client's express authorization"
is needed before a lawyer can settle a cause of action. 4 In addi-
tion, while referencing The Law Governing Lawyers on implied
authority, a federal court required "express authority from the
client" for a lawyer to make a contract on a client's behalf, under
Tennessee law.'
1 5
109 Saxton v. Splettstoezer, 557 P.2d 1126, 1127 (Alaska 1976).
110 Augustus v. John Williams & Assocs., Inc., 589 P.2d 1028, 1030 (N.M. 1979).
111 THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 27, § 38.
112 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 7, cmt. c; see also id. § 26, cmt. c
(stating that implied authority "may be inferred from words or conduct which the
principal has reason to know indicate to the agent that he is to do the act for the
benefit of the principal").
113 THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 27, § 38 cmt. a.
114 Brewer v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1334 (I11. 1995).
Whether such statements necessarily exclude the recognition of implied, apparent or
other forms of lawyer civil claim settlement authority is often unclear. While the
Brewer court did not discuss possible apparent authority, earlier appellate court
precedents, such as Sakun v. Taffer, 643 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (I11. App. Ct. 1994). had
employed the concept in factual circumstances similar to those in Brewer.
115 West Knoxville Assocs. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., No. 95-5931, 1997 WL 561420, at
*12 n.6 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 1997); see also Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645,
650 (Cal. 1985) (stating that it is "well settled" that a lawyer must be "specifically
authorized to settle"); In re Marriage of Helsel, 243 Cal. Rptr. 657, 661 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988) ("[llt is equally clear that the Blanton court was of the view that a law-
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There are inconsistent applications even among the jurisdic-
tions where a client may be bound to a settlement by virtue of
implied authority. Courts differ on the creation and conditions
of a lawyer's implied authority. Thus, laws on the form of client
conduct that may prompt implied authority, as well as on any
necessary language, are unsettled.
Most courts hold that the "retention of an attorney" does not
prompt implied authority "without more" conduct from the cli-
ent."16 As observed by the Kentucky Supreme Court, it "is al-
most universal that an attorney, clothed with no other authority
than that arising from his relationship, has no implied power to
... settle." '117 However, a few American courts do find that the
retention of a lawyer is crucial to recognizing an "apparent" au-
thority to settle, at least where settlement occurs in open court or
is in writing. 8
yer has no apparent authority to compromise and settle the lawsuit without the cli-
ent's approval"); Saxton v. Splettstoezer, 557 P.2d 1126, 1127 (Alaska 1976)
(requiring that the authority of a lawyer "to terminate litigation ... be explicit or
ratified by subsequent conduct of the client").
116 See, e.g., Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1302 (Ind. 1998) ("As
a general proposition an attorney's implied authority does not extend to settling the
very business that is committed to the attorney's care without the client's consent.
The vast majority of United States jurisdictions hold that the retention of an attor-
ney to pursue a claim does not, without more, give the attorney the implied author-
ity to settle or compromise the claim.").
117 Clark v. Burden, 917 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Ky. 1996). Similarly, the mere employ-
ment of a lawyer as an attorney of record in pending litigation often will not give rise
to apparent authority for the lawyer to compromise. Blanton, 696 P.2d at 650.
118 See, e.g., Nelson v. Consumer Power Co., 497 N.W.2d 205, 212 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993) (finding that a retained lawyer has apparent authority under Michigan law to
bind a client to a settlement if the settlement is in writing and signed by the attorney,
though such authority arguably is presumptive rather than apparent or implied);
Capital Dredge & Dock Corp. v. City of Detroit, 800 F.2d 525, 530-31 (6th Cir.
1986). In employing Michigan law the court stated:
Generally, when a client hires an attorney and holds him out as counsel
representing him in a matter, the client clothes the attorney with apparent
authority to settle claims connected with the matter . . . . Thus, a third
party who reaches a settlement agreement with an attorney employed to
represent his client in regard to the settled claim is generally entitled to
enforcement of the settlement agreement even if the attorney was acting
contrary to the client's express instructions. In such a situation, the client's
remedy is to sue his attorney for professional malpractice. The third party
may rely on the attorney's apparent authority unless he has reason to be-
lieve that the attorney has no authority to negotiate a settlement.
Id. These two cases were distinguished in Rheault v. Lufthansa German Airlines,
899 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (finding that the cases, at best, address apparent
authority wherein manifestations by the client to the third party were crucial to sus-
taining the agreements reached by the lawyers who had no delegated authority). See
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A more persistent problem lies in the identification of the
forms of additional client conduct beyond the retention of a law-
yer that are sufficient to prompt an implied authority in the law-
yer to settle. One court found that in certain settings implied
authority may be based on a client's admonitions to his lawyer
that he had no settlement figure in mind and that upcoming set-
tlement talks were the lawyer's "job" and "business."1 t 9 Another
court said that while implied authority is not "ordinary," 120 a cli-
ent's active participation in the particulars of settlement negotia-
tions prompted implied authority, where the lawyer's settlement
"took place under the client's watchful eyes" and the lawyer was
not discharged until after the settlement was reached.' 2 '
Regretfully, Model Rule 1.2(a) gives no guidance on the types
of client conduct that might implicitly delegate authority to set-
tie.1 2 Although "the Rules of Professional Conduct govern the
relationship between attorney and client... they do not set forth
the full parameters of the attorney's ability to bind the client in
dealings with third parties. The client may not intend for the at-
torney to settle a claim but may nonetheless imply that intention
to the attorney. "123
The difficulty in ascertaining the type of client conduct that
gives rise to implied authority is compounded by the fact that
American governments have divergent laws and lawmakers ad-
dressing lawyer settlement authority issues. For example, a fed-
eral appeals court, applying Virgin Islands law, referenced
section 26 of the Restatement of Agency, EC 7-7, and judicial pre-
cedent. 124 The court stated that the "attorney-client relationship
also Giesel, supra note 5 (arguing retention-based authority is a form of apparent
authority that comports with the ethical standard that settlement decisions are for
the client).
119 Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792 F.2d 387, 391 (3d Cir. 1986) (using Virgin Islands
law).
120 Clark, 917 S.W.2d at 576.
121 Id. at 576 (suggesting there was a ratification of an unauthorized settlement).
But see Johnson v. Tesky, 643 P.2d 1344 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that a lawyer's
authority to enter into settlement talks does not mean authority to settle has been
delegated).
122 Indeed, as noted earlier, Model Rule 1.2(a) strongly suggests that a client's
decision to settle is nondelegable. On "implied authority," the ABA Annotations
refer only to the Edward case and then discuss ratification cases (involving retroac-
tive authority). 1996 MODEL RULES, supra note 9, at 19; 1992 MODEL RULES, supra
note 9, at 32.
123 Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1303 (Ind. 1998).
124 Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792 F.2d 387, 389-91 (3d Cir. 1986).
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* . . is controlled by the principles of agency law," but that be-
cause of "ethical considerations peculiar to the adjudicatory pro-
cess," agency principles need to be tempered by "judicial
precedent for guidance." '125 In developing an implied authority
standard, the court stated that it is the reasonableness of the law-
yer's act rather than "the intent of the principal" which is the
proper focus. 126 The Colorado Supreme Court referenced sub-
stantive contract law principles in analyzing a lawyer's implied
authority, focused on the client (principal), and held that "[i]n
order for a settlement to be binding. . . 'there must be a meeting
of the minds' as to the terms and conditions of the . . . settle-
ment." 127 While many courts analyze the lawyer-client relation-
ship, and thus any acts or words made by the client, under
general agency or contract laws, 128 others hold that a lawyer has
a "superior agency status" 129 and is "vested with powers superior
to those of any ordinary agent because of the attorney's quasi-
judicial status as an officer of the court."'13 Thus, at times, the
general laws governing agency or contract analysis are supple-
mented or superceded by special laws, such as professional con-




In assessing undelegated lawyer civil claim authority, the focus
is not on the client's conduct with the lawyer; rather, the focus is
the client's or the lawyer's communications or conduct to a third
party or to a tribunal. Here the "interests of third persons and
125 Id. at 389.
126 Id. (referencing RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 26 cmt. c).
127 Cross v. District Court, 643 P.2d 39, 41 (Colo. 1982).
128 See, e.g., Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645. 649 (Cal. 1985) ("As a
general proposition the attorney-client relationship, insofar as it concerns the au-
thority of the attorney to bind his client by agreement or stipulation, is governed by
the principles of agency."); New England Educ. Training Servs., v. Silver St. Partner-
ship, 528 A.2d 1117, 1119 (Vt. 1987) (stating that in determining an implied lawyer
authority issue, agency law provides framework for analyzing attorney-client
relationship).
129 Clark v. Burden, 917 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Ky. 1996).
130 Id.
131 See, e.g., Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Sullivan, 430 N.W.2d 700, 702 (S.D.
1988) (finding that a lawyer had actual authority to settle by a client's acquiescence
after referencing RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY section 26 and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
section 59-3-2 which states "actual authority is such as a principal intentionally con-
fers upon the agent, or intentionally or by want of ordinary care, allows the agent to
believe himself to possess").
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One way a lawyer may bind a client to a settlement agreement
absent delegated authority is through apparent authority. Sec-
tion 39 of The Law Governing Lawyers provides:
[A] lawyer's act is considered to be that of the client in pro-
ceedings before a tribunal or in dealings with a third person if
the tribunal or third person reasonably assumes that the law-
yer is authorized to do the act on the basis of the client's (and
not the lawyer's) manifestations of such authorization.
1 33
The Law Governing Lawyers cross-references section 8 of the
Restatement of Agency which states: "Apparent authority is the
power to affect the legal relations of another person by transac-
tions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, aris-
ing from and in accordance with the other's manifestations to
such third persons. 134 As well, some courts use sections 27135
and 49136 of the Restatement of Agency when discussing lawyers
as apparent agents for their clients.
132 THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 27, Topic 4: Lawyer's Authority
To Act For Client, Introductory Note at 92.
133 Id. § 39 (on apparent authority); see also United States v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 986 F.2d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 1993); Sullivan, 430 N.W.2d at 701 (using the
term "ostensible authority").
134 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 8. Section 8 of the RESTATE-
MENT OF AGENCY is frequently referenced by courts. See, e.g., Fennell v. TLB Kent
Co., 865 F.2d 498, 502 (2d Cir. 1989); Parillo v. Chalk, 681 A.2d 916, 919 (R.I. 1996).
135 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 27 ("[A]pparent authority to do
an act is created as to a third person by written or spoken words or any other con-
duct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to be-
lieve that the principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by the person
purporting to act for him."). See, e.g., Fennell, 865 F.2d at 502 (referencing section
27 for the proposition that the client must manifest to the third party that he con-
sents to have the act done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him);
System Inv. Corp. v. Montriew Acceptance Corp., 355 F.2d 463, 467 (10th Cir. 1966)
(referencing section 27 and finding apparent authority for a lawyer to bind a client
to sales of shares of corporation); Hallock v. State, 474 N.E.2d 1178, 1181 (N.Y.
1984).
136 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 49. Rules applicable to the inter-
pretation of authority are applicable to the interpretation of apparent authority; the
keys are that (a) manifestations of the principal to the other party to the transaction
are interpreted in light of what the other party knows or should know instead of
what the agent knows or should know and that (b) if there is a latent ambiguity in
the manifestations of the principal for which he is not at fault, the interpretation of
apparent authority is based on the facts known to the principal. Id.; see also Rosen-
blum v. Jacks or Better of Am. W. Inc., 745 S.W.2d 754, 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
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Unfortunately, Model Rule 1.2(a) neither mentions nor inti-
mates apparent authority. Some courts will reference Model
Rule 1.2(a), or its state law equivalent, as the guiding legal stan-
dard, but then proceed to find apparent authority.137 Besides the
ALI pronouncements, courts employing the doctrine of apparent
authority for lawyer settlements may reference court rules138 or
employ an equity analysis.
139
Regardless of the lawmaking technique and lawmaker, the
term apparent authority can be used incorrectly when referring
to what the ALl calls implied authority or presumptive authority.
For example, one Illinois appellate court affirmed a finding that a
lawyer had apparent authority to settle, as his authority was
deemed "the logical implied extension of his express author-
ity."' 4 ° And, the New Mexico Supreme Court enforced a settle-
ment, in part, based on apparent authority where there was a
presumption that a lawyer has the authority to settle in a court-
room. Here, the client's representative stood by without objec-
tion when the lawyer settled, leading the court to infer "apparent
authority" from the principal's "knowingly" permitting its lawyer
to act. 4 '
Additionally, whatever the lawmaking technique and whoever
the lawmaker, legal standards which look quite comparable can
be employed quite differently from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In
some situations, the retention of a lawyer for purposes of civil
(referencing section 49 of the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY in its apparent authority
analysis).
137 See, e.g., Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1303-04 (Ind. 1998);
Clark v. Burden, 917 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Ky. 1996).
138 See, e.g., Nelson v. Consumer Power Co., 497 N.W.2d 205, 209 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993); Hallock, 474 N.E.2d at 1182.
139 See, e.g., Clark, 917 S.W.2d at 576.
140 Sakun v. Taffer, 643 N.E.2d 1271, 1278 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); see also
Brumbelow v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 308 S.E.2d 544, 546 (Ga. 1983):
[U]nder Georgia law an attorney of record has apparent authority to enter
into an agreement on behalf of his client and the agreement is enforceable
against the client by other settling parties .... This authority is determined
by the contract between the attorney and the client and by instructions
given the attorney by the client, and in the absence of express restrictions
the authority may be considered plenary by the court and opposing parties
.... The authority may be considered plenary unless it is limited by the
client and that limitation is communicated to opposing parties.
141 Navajo Tribe of Indians v. Hanosh Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 749 P.2d 90, 92-93
(N.M. 1988); see also Parillo v. Chalk, 681 A.2d 916, 919-20 (R.I. 1996) (stating that




litigation or of client representation at a pretrial conference can
be enough client conduct to trigger apparent authority. A Michi-
gan court concluded that an attorney had apparent authority to
settle by referencing a court rule which required that some per-
son attending a pretrial conference for each side have settlement
authority.'42 Likewise, a Missouri court, referencing section 49
of the Restatement of Agency,'14 3 found apparent authority where
the client "knowingly permitted her attorney to occupy the posi-
tion of exclusive negotiator in the settlement process." 144 Con-
versely, other courts require more positive manifestations from
the client to a third party before an attorney is cloaked with ap-
parent authority to settle. 145 The California Supreme Court, like
most other courts, has found that "an attorney, merely by virtue
of his employment as such has no apparent authority to bind his
client. ' 146 More significantly, a federal appeals court, applying
Virgin Islands law, did not find apparent authority where a law-
yer settled at a pretrial conference because the record was "de-
void of communications directly from the plaintiffs to defense
counsel, much less representations.' 1 47 Another federal appeals
court did not find apparent authority even though a client knew
that his lawyer was actively engaging in settlement negotiations,
never told his lawyer to discontinue settlement talks, and never
communicated a limit on his lawyer's settlement authority.148 As
142 Nelson, 497 N.W.2d at 209 (referencing MICH. CT. R. 2.507 (H)); see also Hal-
lock, 474 N.E.2d at 1182. But see THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 27,
§ 39, illus. 3 (no apparent authority).
143 If a principal puts an agent into, or knowingly permits him to occupy, a posi-
tion which according to the ordinary habits of persons in the locality, trade or pro-
fession, it is usual for such an agent to have a particular kind of authority, anyone
dealing with him is justified in inferring that he has such authority, in the absence of
reason to know otherwise. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 49, cmt. c.
144 Rosenblum v. Jacks or Better of Am. W. Inc., 745 S.W.2d 754, 763 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988).
145 See, e.g., Fennell v. TLB Kent Co., 865 F.2d 498, 502-03 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating
that a lawyer did not have apparent authority to settle where the client did not posi-
tively manifest to the third party that his lawyer had authority to settle); New Eng-
land Educ. Training Servs. v. Silver St. Partnership, 528 A.2d 1117, 1120-21 (Vt.
1987) (holding that a defendant's earlier express grant of authority to lawyer to set-
tle for a certain amount, coupled with "an atmosphere of offers" by that same law-
yer was no "substitute" for required acts by client necessary to trigger apparent
authority).
146 Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 653 (Cal. 1985).
147 Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792 F.2d 387, 391 (3d Cir. 1986).
148 See Fennell, 865 F.2d at 502. The Fennell court held: "These findings involve
only discussions between Fennell and his attorneys .... None of these findings re-
lates to positive actions or manifestations by Fennell to defendants' counsel ......
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a New Jersey court noted, courts "differ as to whether the princi-
pal's communication of apparent authority can be inferred from
his conduct in permitting an attorney to represent him in the liti-
gation or whether a positive manifestation by words or conduct
of the principal is required."' 4 9
Many courts generally agree that communication from the law-
yer is insufficient by itself. Thus, the Indiana Supreme Court de-
clared that a "communication of authority by the agent [lawyer]
is insufficient to create an apparent agency relationship."'
' 50
However, a few courts consider whether a client is bound to a
lawyer's settlement under apparent authority by examining only
the conduct of the lawyer.' 5 1 One court justified the finding of
apparent authority based only on the lawyer's statement that he
had authority to settle by reasoning that otherwise, prudent liti-
gants could not rely on opposing counsel's representations and
that fears of later assertions that counsel lacked settlement au-
thority would require litigants to go directly to the opposing
party in order to verify authorization for every settlement offer
by a lawyer. 152
Some courts employ the apparent authority doctrine based
upon notions of equity. The apparent authority analysis in Clark
v. Burden is exemplary where the Kentucky Supreme Court
stated if:
[I]t should be determined that third parties who may be deal-
ing with such attorneys would be substantially and adversely
affected by unauthorized attorney settlements, then the client
employing the attorney should be bound. On the other hand,
Id. But see Capital Dredge & Dock Corp. v. City of Detroit, 800 F.2d 525, 530-31
(6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the client was bound by lawyer's settlement because the
client held the lawyer out as having authority to represent the client): Terrain En-
ters. v. Western Cas. and Sur. Co.. 774 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1985) (binding client to
lawyer's settlement agreement because lawyer was retained to handle all aspects of
the litigation).
149 Seacoast Realty Co. v. West Long Branch Borough, 14 N.J. Tax 197, 203
(1994).
150 Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1304 (Ind. 1998); see also Trust-
ees of UIU Health & Welfare Fund v. New York Flame Proofing Co., 828 F.2d 79,
84 (2d Cir. 1987).
151 See, e.g., Triple B & G, Inc. v. City of Fairmont, 494 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992) (holding that a lawyer had apparent authority based, in part, on his state-
ments to city attorney that he had authority to settle); Hayes v. National Serv. In-
dus., 196 F.3d 1252 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that the lawyer had apparent authority
to settle since lawyer's authority is plenary, where no limitation was expressed to
opposing party and lawyer said he had authority to settle for $15,000).
152 Nelson v. Consumer Power Co., 497 N.W.2d 205, 208 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
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if it is determined that no substantial harm will befall third
parties, then ultimate control should remain with the client.
1 53
Some courts that reference equity in finding apparent authority
for a lawyer to settle sometimes do so reluctantly by finding the
legal doctrine "regretful," "unfortunate," and "ambiguous and
conflicting., 154 As one California Supreme Court Justice stated,
"clear guidance" on the scope of an attorney's apparent author-
ity is needed.155 Regrettably, neither the ABA nor the ALl pro-
vide much help.
2. Inherent Authority
Inherent authority is another form of undelegated lawyer civil
claim settlement authority. Here, unlike actual authority or ap-
parent authority, the focus usually is not on the manifestations
made by the client to the lawyer or to a third party; rather, the
focus is on the manifestations of the lawyer to the court. As
there is no provision in The Law Governing Lawyers addressing
inherent authority, the Restatement of Agency provides a useful
touchstone. Section 8A of the Restatement of Agency captioned
"Inherent Agency Powers" states that inherent agency power is
the "power of an agent ... which is derived not from authority,
apparent authority or estoppel, but solely from the agency rela-
tion and exists for the protection of persons harmed by or deal-
ing with a servant or other agent. ' 156 Inherent authority runs the
most afoul of Model Rule 1.2(a) or EC 7-7 since it permits a
lawyer to bind a client regardless of client consent and regardless
of any manifestations by the client to the lawyer or to third par-
ties.157 Not surprisingly, a lawyer's inherent authority to settle is
disfavored and the doctrine is expressly disavowed in many
states.1 58 Some courts state in quite resolute terms that a lawyer
153 Clark v. Burden, 917 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Ky. 1996); see also Cohen v. Goldman,
132 A.2d 414, 417 (R.I. 1975) (finding apparent authority because "where two inno-
cent parties are involved, justice requires that of the two the least culpable should
not be made to suffer").
154 See, e.g., Barton v. Snellson, 735 S.W.2d 160, 162-63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
155 Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 654 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, C.J., concur-
ring); see also Giesel, supra note 5, at 578 ("conflicting messages" from courts on
lawyer's apparent authority to settle).
156 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 28, § 8A.
157 See Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1306 n.8 (Ind. 1998) (ex-
plaining that an attorney's inherent agency power "results from the agency relation
itself," not from any other acts of the client beyond retention of the attorney).
158 See, e.g., Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194, 199 (Ala. 1988) (holding that a
lawyer is a special agent and has no implied or inherent authority to settle); In re
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has no inherent authority to settle.159 However, there are some
courts which do bind a client to an unauthorized settlement by
virtue of a lawyer's inherent authority. At times, where a law-
yer's inherent authority to settle is permitted, the stated legal
guidelines are unsettling. Thus, some courts mention Model
Rule 1.2(a) in one breath and in the next breath allow a lawyer to
do exactly what the rule seemingly forbids: enter into a settle-
ment agreement without abiding by the "client's decision."
The Indiana Supreme Court's recognition of a lawyer's inher-
ent agency authority to settle is a good example of inherent au-
thority, and thus of the dramatic curtailment of a client's right to
control settlement.1 60 The court cited Indiana Professional Con-
duct Rule 1.2(a), t6 ' which follows Model Rule 1.2(a), as well as
section 8A of the Restatement of Agency 162 in determining that a
lawyer has "inherent agency power" to settle "derived not from
authority,... but solely from the agency relation" and that this
exists "for the protection of persons harmed by or dealing with a
servant or other agent." '163 In finding a "longstanding general
rule" that a lawyer "may without express authority, bind his cli-
ent by agreement" though the attorney knows the client has a
good defense, 164 the court pointed to the need for "structural in-
tegrity of court procedures and the protection of third parties
who rely on the finality of those procedures. 1 165 The court said
to hold otherwise "would impede the efficiency and finality of
courtroom proceedings and permit stop and go disruption of the
Campbell, 536 A.2d 544, 547 (Vt. 1987) ("[Ajttorneys in Vermont lack inherent au-
thority to compromise or settle a case and may not act beyond the scope of specific
authority.").
159 See, e.g., Clark, 917 S.W.2d at 576.
160 Koval, 693 N.E.2d at 1304-07; see also Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1037
n.9 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying Pennsylvania law the Court stated that an "agent may
also derive certain powers ... from the agency relation ... this inherent agency
power is not construed as constituting actual authority, but stands in its stead to bind
the principal to acts of his agent"); Farris v. J.C. Penney Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 695, 700
(E.D. Pa. 1998) (finding that a more rational approach might be to adopt inherent
agency doctrine as an alternative basis to uphold a settlement in cases where express
authority is lacking, and the principal has made no manifestations of authorization
to the third party, but the attorney has taken various steps indicating that he has
authority to settle, i.e., attending a settlement conference limited by the court to
attorneys authorized to bind their clients should the clients not attend).
161 Koval, 693 N.E.2d at 1303 n.6.
162 Id. at 1304.
163 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 8A).





Presumptive authority is another form of undelegated lawyer
civil claim settlement authority. Such authority arises when the
required conditions under law are met triggering a presumption
that a lawyer has been delegated settlement authority. Similar to
inherent authority, the focus is usually on conduct of the agent
(lawyer), not on the conduct of the principal (client). Often, the
deciding factor involves the place where the settlement agree-
ment was reached by the lawyer. Here, courts frequently need to
differentiate between in-court and out-of-court proceedings.
While the ALI Law Governing Lawyers recognizes that there
are presumptions relating to a lawyer's authority "to represent" a
client,16 7 it fails to recognize the more particular presumptions
which operate on the delegation of civil claim settlement author-
ity. Without much ABA or ALI guidance, several difficulties
have arisen with the use of presumptive lawyer settlement au-
thority. First, courts differ on how any in-court presumptions
may be rebutted. Second, key distinctions between in-court and
out-of-court proceedings are often difficult to draw. Finally,
courts sometimes confuse the principles of presumptive authority
with apparent authority and other forms of lawyer authority.
One presumption exists in Illinois where "the existence of the
attorney of record's authority to settle in open court is pre-
sumed. ' 168 There, it is presumed that the client has delegated
express authority to the lawyer to settle while in-court unless ex-
press authority is "rebutted by affirmative evidence." '169 Such af-
firmative evidence marshalled by the client can simply involve
affidavits (from client and lawyer) indicating that the client did
not delegate settlement authority. 170 Elsewhere, the burden of
proof needed to rebut a presumption of in-court settlement au-
166 Id. at 1306.
167 THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 27, § 37.
168 Brewer v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1334 (I11. 1995)
(common law presumption); see also Sorenson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 992 F.
Supp. 146, 149 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that when attorney of record enters into a
settlement agreement, there is a presumption that the attorney had authority to do
so); Bradford Exch. v. Trein's Exch., 600 F.2d 99, 102 (7th Cir. 1979) (stating that an
attorney of record is presumed to have his client's authority to settle litigation).
169 Brewer, 649 N.E.2d at 1334.
170 Id.; see also Hayes v. Eagle Picher Indus., 513 F.2d 892, 893 (10th Cir. 1975)
(in-court presumption "is rebutted easily").
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thority is more substantial.' 7 '
At times, courts have difficulty distinguishing between in-court
and out-of-court proceedings for presumptive authority pur-
poses. Is an off-the-record conference in a judge's chambers an
in-court proceeding? 172 With the explosion of court-annexed and
contractually or legislatively demanded alternative dispute reso-
lution forums, what are courts for in-court presumption
purposes?
173
Confusion about presumptive authority also arises because
some courts speak of apparent authority when what they mean
(or should mean) to speak of is an in-court presumption about
lawyer settlement authority. For example, in a New York case, a
court applied a local court rule requiring that a lawyer or other
person from each side attending a pretrial conference have settle-
ment authority. 74 Through this local rule, a client who did not
attend a conference was bound to a settlement agreement ar-
ranged by his lawyer at the conference without evidence of client
consent. The court used an apparent authority analysis. 75 How-
ever, in the absence of any evidence on the personal conduct of
the client (such as knowledge of the conference), this local court
rule should have been read to indicate that an in-court presump-
tion arises at such a conference.
Likewise, in Missouri the courts have struggled with presump-
tive authority. One appellate court declared that where a party's
attorney of record represented that he had authority from the
client and then reached an agreement with the other party's law-
yer to settle, the first party must prove that his attorney lacked
authority to settle since settlement authority is "presumed prima
facie to be authorized.' 1 76 Subsequently, another appellate court
seemed confused, stating that the presumption "stems primarily
171 See, e.g., Sorenson, 992 F. Supp. at 149 (stating that a client seeking to rebut an
in-court presumption bears the burden to rebut such a presumption and the burden
is "not insubstantial").
172 See, e.g., Infante v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 6 F.Supp. 2d 608, 610 (E.D.
Tex. 1998) (holding that under court rules a settlement must be in writing unless
"made in open court."
173 See, e.g., Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1307 (Ind. 1998)
(holding that a mediation governed by the Indiana Rules of Alternative Dispute
Resolution was an "in court proceeding"); Miller v. Ryan, 706 N.E.2d 244, 252 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a medical review panel meeting is an "in-court proceed-
ing," in part because the presiding official is a statutorily-approved panel chairman).
174 Hallock v. State. 474 N.E.2d 1178, 1179 (N.Y. 1984).
M75 Id. at 1182.
176 Leffler v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 612 S.W.2d 835, 837 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
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from a failure to properly distinguish between implied and ap-
parent authority. ' 177 And, another appellate court critiqued the
presumption as it "has led our courts to an anacoluthon in the
law of agency. ' 178 That court explained that the focus of the pre-
sumption was on the "acts" or "representations" made by the
lawyer, instead of the client. This court created a "mutation," a




Undelegated lawyer civil claim settlement authority may also
arise after-the-fact. Retroactive authority, also termed "ratifica-
tion," occurs where the client undertakes post-settlement con-
duct which effectively ratifies or "retroactively" authorizes a
lawyer's previously unauthorized settlement. 180  Section 38 of
The Law Governing Lawyers says that a "lawyer's act is consid-
ered to be that of a client in proceedings before a tribunal or in
dealings with third parties when ... the client ratifies the act." 18
There is a cross-reference to section 82 of the Restatement of
Agency 182 which is expressly followed by a number of
jurisdictions.
The primary focus with ratification is on the principal's (cli-
ent's) actions involving an earlier unauthorized settlement agree-
ment completed by the agent (lawyer). Problems about forms of
client conduct that are sufficient to ratify do arise. The problems
are exacerbated by the fact that Model Rule 1.2(a) provides little
177 Barton v. Snellson, 735 S.W.2d 160, 162-163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
178 Rosenblum v. Jacks or Better of Am. W. Inc., 745 S.W.2d 754, 761 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988).
179 Id. at 760-62.
180 See, e.g., Hawai'i Hous. Auth. v. Uyehara, 883 P.2d 64, 71 (Haw. 1994) (hold-
ing that when an unauthorized act of an agent is ratified it is as binding on the
principal as would be an original express grant of authority).
181 THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 27, § 38.
182 Within section 82 of the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 28, comments
b and c, the ALl says:
Ratification is not a form of authorization, but its peculiar characteristic is
that ordinarily it has the same effect as authorization .... The concept of
ratification is not a legal fiction, but denotes the legal consequences which
result from a series of events beginning with a transaction inoperative as to
the principal, and ending in an act of validation. The statement that there
is a relation back to the time of the original act is fictitious in form, but in
effect, it is a statement of liabilities.
Id. § 82, cmts. b, c.
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help as it makes no mention of ratification and by the fact that
The Law Governing Lawyers classifies ratification as an instance
of "actual authority.
183
In employing retroactive lawyer civil claim settlement author-
ity, some courts focus on the timing of client conduct. For exam-
ple, a federal appeals court has held that a client's immediate
repudiation of the settlement agreement within a few days or a
"reasonable time" is a bar to ratification.' 84 Another federal ap-
peals court, applying federal common law, held that clients had
ratified their lawyer's unauthorized settlement agreement by
waiting "sixteen months after the date of the settlement before
attempting to deny" their attorney's authority.
185
Elsewhere, timing seems less important. For example, the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court has held that a client can ratify an attor-
ney's earlier unauthorized settlement when the client "has
knowledge of the unauthorized acts of his agent, and remains si-
lent, when he should speak, or accepts the benefit of such
acts ... ."186 A federal appeals court also held that a client had
not ratified his lawyer's unauthorized settlement agreement even
though accepting benefits for "at least four years," because "one
essential prerequisite to a principal's ratification of an unauthor-
ized act is that at the time of the ratification the principal have
knowledge of all material facts."'187
CONCLUSION
While often presumed or declared to be quite settled, many of
183 Section 38 of THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 27, is entitled "Law-
yer's Actual Authority," notwithstanding its commentary in section 82 of the RE-
STATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 28, and the employment by many courts in this
setting of actual authority to mean either express or implied authority.
184 Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 513 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (four years
held to be an unreasonable time); see also Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645,
653 (Cal. 1985) (holding that ratification did not occur when immediately upon
learning of the arbitration agreement the plaintiff fired her attorney and engaged
new counsel to set it aside); Clark v. Burden, 917 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Ky. 1996) (hold-
ing that an unauthorized settlement may be ratified by a client's silence unless disap-
proved within a reasonable time).
185 United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 986 F.2d 15, 20 (2d Cir.
1993).
186 Brady v. Bryant, 894 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Ark. 1995) (employing sections 94, 98
and 99 of the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY).
187 Capital Dredge & Dock Corp. v. City of Detroit, 800 F.2d 525, 530 (6th Cir.
1986) (referencing sections 91 and 98 of the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, though not
discussing any duty of inquiry by the client).
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the guidelines on lawyer civil claim settlement authority are un-
settled, leaving unresolved questions for lawyers, clients, and the
courts. The upcoming publication and general circulation by the
ALl of The Law Governing Lawyers will help, as may any atten-
tion directed toward settlements by the ABA Ethics 2000 Com-
mission, now at work considering possible alterations of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Recent experience sug-
gests that state and federal court rulings are not likely to settle
much of the present uncertainty.
Our review of the prevailing lawyer civil settlement guidelines
suggests the need for certain new initiatives. First, the guidelines
should predominantly originate in state supreme courts. At the
very least, their general parameters should usually appear in
written rules on the professional conduct of lawyers. For now,
federal courts should defer to these state rules unless there are
very significant federal interests.
Second, as a starting point, state courts should carefully con-
sider the ALI pronouncements in The Law Governing Lawyers.
Lawyers generally are not like other agents, nor are lawyer re-
tainer and subsequent legal service agreements generally like
other contracts. Unlike most other agents, the conduct of law-
yers with third persons on behalf of clients is governed not only
by the directives of clients, but also by mandatory professional
conduct standards. Furthermore, unlike most other contracts,
lawyer-client legal service agreements are constrained by public
policies found in these same standards, including obligations on
information disclosure (from lawyer to client) and on confidenti-
ality (by the lawyer). Thus, lawyers should keep clients informed
of settlement talks even if the relevant legal services agreement
does not expressly indicate such an obligation. Moreover, law-
yers should not reveal the nature of their delegated authority to
the adversaries of their clients even when these adversaries have
good reason to know.
In employing the AL pronouncements, sensitivity to terminol-
ogy will be necessary. Distinctions between delegated and un-
delegated authority, as well as between the varying forms of both
delegated and undelegated authority should be set forth. These
distinctions need not appear in written laws, but rather may sim-
ply be recognized in accompanying commentaries (which hope-
fully will dispel any notions that clients always make the civil
claim settlement "decisions").
[Vol. 78, 1999]
Unsettling Questions Regarding Lawyer Civil Claim Settlement Authority
Third, in civil claim settlement settings involving the interests
of two or more American governments, issues of lawyer civil
claim settlement authority should normally be resolved with the
lawyer professional conduct laws of the state where the relevant
civil claim is pending. Otherwise, the choice of law standards in
Model Rule 8.5(b) should resolve this issue. The interests of an-
other state government are rarely so compelling as to usurp the
need for a trial court to apply the law of its own government to
lawyer conduct during pending civil litigation. And to date, there
has been little federal interest in overriding the usually applica-
ble state professional conduct standards for lawyers involved in
federal civil litigation, though certain readings of Federal Civil
Procedure Rule 16, for example, may some day establish at least
one uniform federal approach. Outside of civil litigation, typi-
cally the licensing states are most interested in the application of
their professional conduct standards to lawyer activity.
Fourth, when the general written rule (or code) provisions on
lawyer conduct are supplemented (and, at times, overridden), the
general laws should cross-reference, to the extent feasible, the
special laws so there can be appropriate integration of all appli-
cable standards. Similar to FOWBPA, simple recognition of
these special laws is difficult at times because of the language
used. At other times, difficulties arise because relevant lawmak-
ing powers are shared, leading to special laws being scattered
throughout a variety of sources including court rules, statutes and
case decisions.
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